Changing Economic Leadership:A New Benchmark of Sector Productivity in the United States and Western Europe, ca. 1910 by Frankema, Ewout et al.
  
 University of Groningen
Changing Economic Leadership
Frankema, Ewout; Woltjer, Pieter; Smits, Jan-Pieter
Published in:
Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis
DOI:
10.18352/tseg.219
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2013
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Frankema, E., Woltjer, P., & Smits, J-P. (2013). Changing Economic Leadership: A New Benchmark of
Sector Productivity in the United States and Western Europe, ca. 1910. Tijdschrift voor Sociale en
Economische Geschiedenis, 10(2), 80-113. https://doi.org/10.18352/tseg.219
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
tijdschrift voor sociale en economische geschiedenis 10 [2013] nr. 3, pp. 80-113 
Ewout Frankema, Pieter Woltjer and Jan Pieter Smits
changIng economIc leadershIp
A new benchmark of sector productivity in the United States  
and Western Europe, ca. 1910
Abstract
The debate concerning the exact timing and causes of changes in economic 
leadership constitutes one of the central themes in economic history. This study 
aims to improve the measurement of economic performance in the United 
States and Western Europe (Britain, France and the Netherlands) during the 
long nineteenth century by constructing a new benchmark of sector productivity 
and new estimates of comparative gdp per capita and per worker. Our main 
finding is that the Anglo-Dutch and Anglo-American take-overs should be lo-
cated earlier in time than suggested by the conventional Maddison database. 
We offer an explanation for this result by looking at differences in sectoral pro-
ductivity performance as well as the different structures (sectoral employment 
shares) of the economy.  
Introduction
Long term series of internationally comparable gdp constitute one of the 
cornerstones of the economic history discipline. The late Angus Maddison 
(1926-2010), one of the pre-eminent economic historians of the twenti-
eth century, devoted much of his academic career to the construction and 
improvement of a global dataset of historical national accounts.1 His efforts 
* Acknowledgements: We are grateful to Herman de Jong, Jan Luiten van Zanden, Steve 
Broadberry, Knick Harley, Robert Allen and the participants of the session on Compara-
tive Wages and Productivity at the Eighth Conference of the European Historical Econom-
ics Society (ehes) and the Graduate Workshop in Economic and Social History of Oxford 
University for their comments on previous drafts of this paper. We are also grateful to 
Marianne Ward and John Devereux for their permission to cite from unpublished work. 
Pieter Woltjer’s research was supported by a grant from the Netherlands Organisation for 
Scientific Research (nwo Grant no.: 360–53–102).
1. See for some of his key publications, A. Maddison, Phases of capitalist development 
(Oxford 1982); idem, The world economy: a millennial perspective (Paris 2001); idem, Contours 
of the world economy, 1-2030 ad: essays in macro-economic history (Oxford 2007). 
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are being continued by a large group of scholars who have committed to pur-
sue his legacy in the so-called Maddison Project.2 Although few scholars, if any, 
consider gdp series to be a perfect measure of economic welfare at present or 
in the past, they remain the single-best alternative to study long-term develop-
ments in the world economy by displaying phases of growth and stagnation, 
and by offering a fairly comprehensive tool for comparing the economic per-
formance of national economies at given points in time.
Users, as opposed to constructors, of historical national accounts, often do 
not fully recognize that the construction of gdp estimates requires substan-
tial amounts of disaggregated data on output, income, expenditure and inter-
national trade. This implies that the process of constructing internationally 
comparable gdp series is, by itself, at least as worthwhile as obtaining the final 
results at the aggregate level. The construction-process informs researchers 
about the underlying structure and the disaggregated performance charac-
teristics (comparative productivity levels) of the economy. This study exploits 
this advantage by building up a new, early twentieth century comparison of 
gdp in the United States and Western Europe from a disaggregated level. 
Our benchmark not only provides a check upon existing historical national 
accounts, but offers new insights into the relative strengths and weaknesses 
of the main economic sectors (e.g. agriculture, mining, manufacturing and 
services) for these leading industrial nations as well. 
Although the research on historical national income accounts dates 
back to the early post-war era, with seminal studies of John Kendrick for the 
us, Charles Feinstein for the uk and early comparative studies by Simon 
Kuznets, there still remains a lot of work to be done.3 For sub-Saharan Africa, 
for instance, there have recently been just the first attempts to push exist-
ing post-1950 series back into the colonial era. The preliminary results of 
these efforts point to a considerable revision of traditional perspectives on 
long-term African welfare development.4 For Britain and the Netherlands, 
existing series for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have only recently 
2. See J. Bolt and J.L. van Zanden, ‘The first update of the Maddison project; re-estimating 
growth before 1820’, Maddison Project Working Paper 4 (2013).
3. J. Kendrick, Productivity trends in the United States (Princeton 1961); C.H. Feinstein, 
National income, expenditure and output of the United Kingdom, 1855-1965 (Cambridge 1972); 
S. Kuznets, Modern economic growth. Rate, structure and spread (New haven 1966).
4. L. Prados de la Escosura, ‘Output per head in pre-independence Africa: quantitative 
conjectures’, Economic History of Developing Regions 27:2 (2012) 1-36. See for an alternative 
approach of gdp series the real wage study by E. Frankema and M. van Waijenburg, ‘Struc-
tural Impediments to African Growth? New Evidence from Real Wages in British Africa, 
1880-1965’, Journal of Economic History 72:4 (2012) 895-926.
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been pushed back into medieval times.5 Nonetheless, the continuous work 
on historical national accounts does not only involve covering bare territory, 
it also involves improving of what is already available. Indeed, the adoption 
of refined methods of calculation and the use of new data sources can lead to 
marked changes in our views on comparative economic performance, even 
for those western economies that have been most thoroughly researched by 
economic historians. These revisions, in turn, spark off new debates on long-
term economic development. 
In the spirit of Angus Maddison, the key motivation for this study is to fur-
ther our insights in the dynamics of long-term economic performance among 
some of the world’s leading economies of the past centuries. More specifically, 
we are interested in a more refined measurement and understanding of the 
British-Dutch and us-British take-over during the long nineteenth century 
(1780-1914). We do so by presenting a new benchmark of comparative sector 
productivity for the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States and 
France around the years 1909-10. The first three countries have been subse-
quent technological leaders from the seventeenth century until present. In 
addition, France provides an interesting case, as one of the largest Western 
European economies, which followed a rather specific path of economic and 
industrial development.6 
In brief, our analysis suggests that the relative position of the Dutch econ-
omy vis-à-vis the uk and us was considerably weaker than the conventional 
Maddison estimates indicate. This finding has important implications for 
the timing of the historical Anglo-Dutch take-over, which has hitherto been 
located in the mid-nineteenth century (see figure 1). In fact, our calculations 
suggest that this take-over should be situated in the late eighteenth century, 
instead of the mid-nineteenth century as suggested by the Maddison data. 
The main reason for this revision is that we find the Dutch manufacturing 
sector to be even more underdeveloped (in comparative terms) at the eve 
of World War One than previously assumed. Our second finding is that the 
relative strength of the American economy has been underestimated by Mad-
dison and various other scholars. Our study suggests that the us had chal-
lenged British economic leadership in terms of relative labour productivity 
as well as relative income levels long before 1900, and not thereafter (see 
again figure 1). This finding ties into an on-going debate on the timing of 
the Anglo-American take-over, which we will briefly allude to below. Finally, 
5. J.L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen, ‘Persistent but not consistent: The growth of 
national income in Holland 1347–1807,’ Explorations in Economic History 49:2 (2012) 119-
130; Broadberry et al., ‘British economic growth, 1270-1870’, cage Working Paper 35 (2010).
6. Ideally we would have included Germany in this study as well, but we have excluded 
this country for data constraints. These constraints can be dealt with, but warrant a separate 
study. 
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we find that our results for France are closely in line with the Maddison data 
and that the sector decomposition of our productivity estimates confirm the 
weak competitiveness of French agriculture. Given the relative importance of 
agriculture in nineteenth-century France, this offers additional explanatory 
power to the French resort to economic protectionism during the agricultural 
depression of the late nineteenth century (1879-1896). 
As noted above, in the economic history literature the Anglo-American 
take-over has been subject to heated academic debate. Although this debate 
is partly driven by disparate methods of comparing national income and pro-
ductivity levels as well as the use of different data sources, the controversy 
ultimately comes down to opposing views on the structural characteristics of 
both economies in the nineteenth century. All researchers involved agree on 
one central aspect, namely the huge us productivity advance in manufactur-
ing relative to Western Europe (including the uk). The Anglo-American gap 
is generally considered to have been of a magnitude of 2-2.5 to 1 around the 
turn of the century. However, scholars such as Steve Broadberry maintain 
that British income levels were largely compensated for this productivity gap, 
prior to 1900, because of two structural features of the British economy. First, 
the employment shift out of agriculture had advanced much further in the uk 
than anywhere else. Whereas, in 1907, roughly 12 percent of the uk labour 
force was active in the low-productive agricultural sector, this share was still 
Figure 1 Maddison’s gdp per capita series nl, uk, us, and fr (uk=100, 1800-1913)
Source: J. Bolt and J.L. van Zanden, ‘The first update of the Maddison project; re-estimating 
growth before 1820’, Maddison Project Working Paper 4 (2013)
84 » Ewout Frankema, Pieter Woltjer and Jan Pieter Smits
as high as 33 percent in the us. The initial British aggregate labour-produc-
tivity lead was thus the result of compositional effects rather than superior 
productivity at the sector level. Second, labour force participation had been 
substantially higher in the uk compared to the us, so that part of the produc-
tivity gap was compensated for by a higher share of income-earners in the 
British economy.7 
Other scholars such as Marianne Ward and John Devereux do not refute 
the existence of these structural differences, but argue that they were insuf-
ficient to compensate for the Anglo-American productivity gap in the nine-
teenth century and that, consequently, the American take over of economic 
leadership occurred much earlier in time, somewhere around mid-century. 
Contrary to Broadberry, Ward and Devereux find a strong us productivity lead 
in agriculture, mining and construction in addition to the generally acknowl-
edged productivity advance of American manufacturing.8 The strong Ameri-
can performance in agriculture makes intuitive sense as it appears unlikely 
that the American agricultural sector was left entirely unaffected by the rapid 
developments in industry during the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury. Given the strong increase in demand for agricultural goods (in particu-
larly from the textile and food and beverage industries), rising wages accom-
panying the labor productivity gains in industry, as well as access to cheap 
fertilizers, energy, farm machinery, and the abundance of land, one would 
expect the American agricultural sector to develop in line with the indus-
trial sector. As noted by Habakkuk, ‘scarcity of labour ensured that, within 
the limits set by geology and climate, American agriculture developed along 
land-intensive, labour saving lines, that is, assumed high labour-productivity 
forms’.9 In addition, a substantial agrarian productivity gap would account for 
the deep impact of the agricultural depression in Western Europe, when mar-
7. S.N. Broadberry, ‘Forging ahead, falling behind and catching-up: A sectoral analysis 
of Anglo-American productivity differences, 1870-1990’, Research in Economic History 17 
(1997) 1-37; idem, ‘How did the United States and Germany overtake Britain? A sectoral 
analysis of comparative productivity levels, 1870-1990’, Journal of Economic History 58:2 
(1998): 375-407; idem, ‘Relative per capita income levels in the United Kingdom and the 
United States since 1870: reconciling time-series projections and direct benchmark esti-
mates’ Journal of Economic History 63:3 (2003) 852-863; S.N. Broadberry and D.A. Irwin, 
‘Labor productivity in the United States and the United Kingdom during the nineteenth 
century’, Explorations in Economic History 43:2 (2006) 257-279. 
8. M. Ward and J. Devereux, ‘Measuring British decline: direct versus long-span income 
measures’ Journal of Economic History 63:3 (2003) 826-851; idem, ‘Relative u.k./u.s. output 
reconsidered: a reply to Professor Broadberry’ Journal of Economic History 64:3 (2004) 879-
891. See for a similar position L. Prados de la Escosura, ‘International comparisons of real 
product, 1820-1990’, Explorations in Economic History 37 (2000) 1-41. 
9. H.J. Habakkuk, American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century. The Search for 
Labour-saving Inventions (Cambridge 1962) 34-37.
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kets in France, the uk and the Netherlands were flooded with cheap American 
and Russian grain. 
In a recent study of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century social tables, Peter 
Lindert and Jeffrey Williamson go even further by claiming that American 
real income levels had already surpassed British levels before the American 
war of independence (1775-1783). Their conclusion is based on a benchmark 
comparison of real incomes of various social classes in 1774, including slave 
households. According to the authors, the relative income position of the us 
fell back in the late eighteenth century as a result of the dislocations caused by 
the war of independence and the gradual decline of the Southern us economy 
during much of the nineteenth century.10 
Our study adds evidence to the revisionist view, as we confirm the high 
Anglo-American productivity differential for agriculture found by Ward and 
Devereux using newly obtained farm-gate prices. In addition, we argue that 
the income gap between the us and the uk was compounded by a huge pro-
ductivity differential in mining, which was a non-negligible sector in both 
the American and British economy. Finally, we argue, in line with Lindert 
and Williamson, that it is difficult to pinpoint the American take-over to one 
particular period in time, as we show a remarkable similarity in economic 
standing during the two closing decades of the nineteenth century.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In the next section 
we discuss some of the details of the methods and sources we have used to 
obtain our new benchmark estimate. We then proceed to present our main 
results. Subsequently, we discuss the main implications of our results for the 
existing views on changing economic leadership in the nineteenth century 
and finish with a brief conclusion. 
Methodology
The main aim of this section is to introduce the reader into the basic meth-
ods, sources and motivations for creating historical benchmarks of output 
(gdp) and productivity. In addition, we explain – avoiding the use of too many 
technical details – why we have chosen to work on the basis of the so-called 
‘industry-of-origin’ approach and have selected 1910 as a benchmark year. 
An international comparison of productivity levels essentially examines 
the ratios of output to inputs (e.g. employment, machinery, etc.) between two 
10. Yet, to which extent the results produced by income comparisons on the basis of social 
tables match up with comparisons of historical national still remains to be seen. See P.H. 
Lindert and J.G. Williamson, ‘American incomes 1774-1860’, nber Working Paper 18396 
(2012).
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(or more) national economies.11 For the production of well-defined, interna-
tionally comparable products a straightforward way to obtain these output 
ratios is to directly compare physical output, or quantity relatives (e.g. volume 
or weight).12 Productivity in the coke industry, for instance, can simply be 
gauged from the volume of output per worker; when an employee in country 
A is able to produce 100 tons of coke over the course of a year while the aver-
age employee in country B produces 200 tons, the ‘physical labour productiv-
ity’ in country A is half that of country B. However, as noted by Inklaar and 
Timmer, the direct comparison of physical units of output for the measure-
ment of productivity is only possible for a specified product or a closely related 
group of products.13 Consequently, this greatly limits the quantity approach’s 
ability to estimate productivity for firms or industries producing a wide array 
of heterogeneous goods or services, which is always the case when compar-
ing productivity at the industry or total economy level. At this level, one is also 
more likely to have access to figures on the total values rather than quantities 
of output and inputs.
To compare the value of production requires a conversion factor that 
expresses the output values of countries A and B into a common currency. 
The most direct way is to use the official exchange rate.14 However, the use of 
exchange rates can substantially underestimate levels of national income and 
product in less-developed countries.15 Exchange rates only reflect the compara-
tive price levels of tradable goods and service in an economy, ignoring the price 
movements of non-tradable commodities and services. In addition, exchange 
rates tend to be affected by capital movements and speculation on the currency 
markets, which may lead to exchange rates volatility. Finally, exchange rates 
may suffer from prolonged over- or undervaluation as a result of deliberate 
trade policies and, therefore, offer a biased indication of purchasing power.
A widely used alternative is a conversion measure based on the relative 
prices of products and services produced or consumed within the countries 
under comparison. Such a measure is often referred to as a Purchasing Power 
Parity (ppp). A ppp systematically weighs the prices of a selection of products and 
services in any pair of economies and, by doing so, offers a conversion measure 
11. B. van Ark and M.P. Timmer, ‘The icop manufacturing database: international com-
parisons of productivity levels’, International Productivity Monitor 3 (2001), 44-51, 44.
12. R. Inklaar and M.P. Timmer, ‘ggdc productivity level database: international compari-
son of output, inputs and productivity at the industry level’, ggdc Research Memorandum 
104 (2008) 6-8.
13. Inklaar and Timmer, ‘ggdc Productivity level database’, 6.
14. A. Maddison and B. van Ark, ‘International comparison of purchasing power, real out-
put and labour productivity: a case study of Brazilian, Mexican and u.s. manufacturing, 
1975’, Review of Income and Wealth 35 (1989) 31-55, 31-32.
15. I.B. Kravis, A. Heston and R. Summers, World product and income: international 
comparisons of real gross product (Baltimore 1982).
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that allows one to express levels of output or income in the currency of a single 
(base) country. Most of the benchmark studies – most notably the work done 
under the auspices of the International Comparison Project (icp) by the United 
Nations – develop ppps using the expenditure approach.16 Here, for a certain 
benchmark year, the relative price level is derived by gathering lists of (average) 
consumer prices for a sample of final demand products across countries. For 
example, the relative price level of a haircut in France is compared to the price 
of a haircut in the United States. The ppp is then defined as the ratio of these 
prices. If, for example, a haircut cost 30 francs in France and 10 dollars in the 
us, the ppp (expressed in dollars) is equal to 3 (30/10=3). Typically, in expendi-
ture studies, the ppps for various final consumer products are aggregated to the 
Gross Domestic Product (gdp) level and used to compare total output.
The expenditure approach establishes a direct link between compara-
tive income levels and consumption possibilities, making these estimates 
particularly well suited for international comparisons of income and living 
standards. However, for the international comparison of productivity and eco-
nomic performance in general, a direct comparison of output at the industry 
level is preferable.17 Previous studies have shown that large cross-industry 
differences exist in the relative prices levels, obviating the need for industry-
specific ppps. One of the drawbacks of using expenditure ppps for this pur-
pose is that they are based solely on final consumer products, thus ignoring 
the relative price levels of intermediate goods which can make up as much as 
half of total output for some industries. In addition, the expenditure ppps are 
influenced by imports, trade margins, domestic taxes and the cost of trans-
portation, which may create a substantial bias in the retail price levels as 
opposed to the recorded farm- or factory-gate values of products. 
Alternatively, the industry-of-origin approach can be applied. In line with 
the expenditure approach, the industry-of-origin approach computes ppps on 
the basis of (average) prices. The main difference is that the industry-of-origin 
approach derives the relative price levels from output data at the producer level. 
We opt for the industry-of-origin approach because this method is better 
suited to draw inferences about economic performance and changes in eco-
nomic leadership, as opposed to comparing living standards. In addition, by 
opting for the industry-of-origin approach we are able to break down gdp and 
estimate the comparative performance at both the industry as well as the total 
economy level, using industry-specific ppps that convert sector or branch-level 
output into a common currency. As we will show below, these disaggregate pro-
ductivity levels prove to be instrumental in explaining the forces behind first the 
British and then the American cycle of catch-up, taking-over and forging ahead.
16. Kravis, Heston and Summers, World product and income.
17. B. van Ark, International comparisons of output and productivity: manufacturing productivity 
performance of ten countries from 1950 to 1990 (Groningen 1993).
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Long-run time-series
Maddison’s dataset is based on an international price comparisons for the 
benchmark year 1990. He relies on the expenditure approach described 
above and expresses his gdp series in so-called international dollars using 
these 1990 ppps. Time-series of gdp are then obtained by backward and for-
ward extrapolation of the individual series, adjusting for annual gdp growth 
(or decline) and changes in domestic price levels (inflation or deflation).
While relying on just one benchmark year for the conversion of long-run 
gdp series to a common currency – as opposed to constructing direct bench-
marks for each year individually – saves an enormous amount of additional 
research, the major drawback of this approach is that the potential margin of 
error widens the further one gets into the past. There are at least three reasons 
for this. Firstly, the deflators used by national statistical offices to adjust time-
series of national income do not contain the same products and services as 
captured by the 1990 ppps. Secondly, the type of commodities and services 
that are being consumed or produced shifts over time. For instance, a 1990 
ppp may contain consumer prices of a mid-sized family car, a personal com-
puter and a vacuum cleaner, commodities that did either not exist (or were of 
a complete different quality) in 1900, let alone 1800 or 1500! Thirdly, time-
series always contain major breaks for periods where price, income or pro-
duction data is scarce or non-existent. For the twentieth-century gdp series, 
for instance, there are gaps during the two World Wars. In addition, for the 
accurate measurement of inflation occasional bouts of hyperinflation or a 
change in currency (e.g. introduction of the euro) may lead to further biases.
To accommodate these concerns we created a new ppp benchmark for the 
year 1909/10, providing us with a new point of reference just before World 
War One, and at the end of a long period of relative price stability in the West-
ern economies. Without doubt, the products that we were able to include in 
our ppp estimates offer a much more accurate reflection of production pat-
terns in the nineteenth century than the 1990 expenditure ppps that are cur-
rently in use. This new early 20th century benchmark allows us to check the 
validity of existing long term series from the Maddison database and to adjust 
the existing series with the new conversion factor at hand.
Sources
We have calculated average farm and factory gate prices from the values and 
quantities of the products reported in official agricultural, mining and manu-
facturing production censuses. These surveys contain detailed information 
on quantities and values of produced items, average prices, gross output, 
intermediate input and employment, enabling us to construct labour produc-
tivity comparisons bottom-up. For the United States we based our analysis 
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on the Thirteenth Census of the United States taken in the year 1910, published 
by the Bureau of the Census of the U.S. Department of Commerce and the 
Mineral Resources of the Unites States published by the Department of the Inte-
rior as part of the United States Geological Survey. For the United Kingdom 
we relied primarily on the First Census of Production of 1907 published under 
the census of production act of 1906. The data for the Netherlands was taken 
from the Verslag over den Landbouw in Nederland 1910 and the Statistiek van 
de voortbrenging en het Verbruik der Nederlandsche Nijverheid in 1913 en 1916 
published by the Department of Agriculture (Departement van Landbouw) 
and the National Statistical Office (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek). For 
France we based our analysis on the Evaluation de la Production published by 
the Chambers of Commerce (1910) and the Statistiques Administratives (1912). 
In addition we relied on the Annuaire Statistique de la France for 1908 and the 
summary tables of 1966. A complete overview of sources used can be found 
in the appendix.
Business cycle and capacity utilization effects can have a significant influ-
ence on the measurement of output and productivity levels for a particular 
year. However, as the countries included were all in a comparable state of 
economic growth at that time, we believe that for our purposes the years 
1909/1910 are suitable for a fair comparison.18 In addition, the detailed source 
data required for this type of analysis is largely available for these years, or 
some years sufficiently close (see the appendix). As already mentioned above, 
the censuses do not refer to exactly the same year and they are not completely 
comparable in coverage. The British census of 1907, the American census of 
1910 and the Dutch census of 1913 provide an almost complete coverage of 
agriculture, mining and manufacturing. The two French censuses for 1910/12 
and 1912/13 consist of several investigations for single industries and do not 
provide the same coverage as for the other countries. Nonetheless, additional 
sources for France, such as the studies of Markovitch, Toutain and Dormois 
enabled us to apply our ppp estimates to value added estimates at a sector 
and total economy level.19 Where necessary we used existing price indices 
to extrapolate price data backwards or forwards to our 1909/10 benchmark.
18. For an elaborate discussion of the business cycle and capacity utilization effects and a 
sensitivity analysis for the interbellum see H. de Jong and P. Woltjer, ‘Depression dynam-
ics: a new estimate of the Anglo-American manufacturing productivity gap in the interwar 
period’, Economic History Review 64 (2011) 472-492.
19. T. Markovitch, ‘Le produit physique de l’économie francasie de 1789 à 1964’, Cahiers 
de l’isea 164:4 (1965); J.C. Toutain, ‘Le produit intérieur brut de la France de 1789 à 1982’, 
Economies et Societés 15 (1987); J.P. Dormois, ‘Tracking the elusive French productivity lag 
in industry, 1840-1973’, Hi-Stat Discussion Paper 152 (2006).
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Main results20
This section discusses our main results. Table 1 presents our ppp estimates 
for agriculture, mining, manufacturing and the combined ppp for agricul-
ture and industry; the latter also includes construction.21 These relative prices 
were constructed on the basis of 149 different products in the case of the 
Anglo-American comparison, 66 in the case of the Netherlands and 41 for 
the France-us comparison. The sample of products in this study ranges from 
wheat to pig meat for the agricultural sector, iron ore to petroleum in mining 
and jute yarn to sulphuric acid in manufacturing.22
Table 1   Purchasing Power Parities, us, uk, nl and fr (ca. 1910)








Exchange rate 0.21 2.5 5.2 … … …
Agriculture 0.23 2.2 7.9 29 15 13
Mining 0.34 4.9 7.6 9 1 10
Manufacturing 0.19 2.5 5.2 111 50 18
 Metals & machinery 0.22 3.9 5.8 30 7 2
 Textiles, leather & clothing 0.16 2.1 3.8 24 12 3
 Food, drink & tobacco 0.19 1.9 6.2 20 11 7
 Chemicals 0.21 3.4 7.7 23 14 4
 Miscellaneous 0.20 1.9 5.4 14 6 2
Total: agriculture & industry 0.20 2.3 6.2 149 66 41
Sources: see appendix.
The number of product-matches for each individual sector are shown in the 
last three columns of table 1. Overall, for the Anglo-American comparison, the 
products included in our benchmark comparison covered nearly 90 percent 
of total gross output in the uk and approximately 70 percent in the us for both 
the agriculture and mining sectors. This so-called coverage ratio was substan-
tially lower for the manufacturing sector, however, which is explained by the 
20. All the underlying data that we used to produce the results shown in this section can be 
obtained via the authors. Please send an email with a data-request to pieter.woltjer@wur.nl.
21. Note that the ppps are based on 1909 prices in the case of manufacturing and 1910 
prices in the case of agriculture and mining. The first row of table 1 lists the 1910 exchange 
rate (which was identical to 1909).
22. A complete list of products included in the calculation of the ppps can be found in the 
appendix to E. Frankema, J.P. Smits and P. Woltjer ‘Comparing Productivity in the Nether-
lands, France, uk and us, ca. 1910: A new ppp benchmark and its implications for changing 
economic leadership’, ggdc Research Memorandum 113 (2010).
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greater heterogeneity of products in this sector, as well as the unique national 
character and qualitative differences of some of the commodities produced. 
Nonetheless, we were able to cover well over 30 percent of the American and 
40 percent of British manufacturing output. For the comparison between 
the Netherlands and the us we covered approximately 50 percent of output 
in agriculture and mining and close to 20 percent in manufacturing. The 
French coverage ratios for the agricultural, mining and manufacturing sec-
tors were 30, 80 and 15 percent respectively. Generally, this is comparable to 
coverage ratios found in previous pre-war productivity studies.23
Table 1 demonstrates that substantial relative price differences existed 
between industries during this period and shows how these related to the offi-
cial exchange rate (presented in the upper row). In the three Western Euro-
pean countries the mining products, which primarily consisted of coal, were 
rather expensive as compared to the us. In France and the uk agricultural 
products were also quite expensive, especially when compared to the relative 
price level of manufactured goods. In contrast, the differences between the 
producer prices of agricultural and manufactured commodities in the Neth-
erlands were relatively small. 
How do our ppp estimates compare to other existing estimates? O’Brien 
and Keyder constructed a total economy ppp for their Anglo-French compari-
son of nineteenth century economic development. Their ppp is based on a 
selection of only six representative commodities; i.e. beef, wheat, coal, flour, 
pig iron and cotton yarn. For the period 1905-1913 their France-uk ppp was 
estimated at 29.0 (using French output weights) and 29.8 (on the basis of 
uk weights), which is in line with our implied ppp estimate of 30.5 French 
francs per British Pound (matched via the us benchmark).24 In an unpub-
lished working paper Burger presented industry ppps for the us, Netherlands 
and France using the uk as base country. Transforming his ppps to us dollar 
based estimates we find comparable results for the Anglo-American compari-
son; Burger, for instance, reported a ppp of 0.19 £/$ for industry while we 
find a relative price level of around 0.20 £/$. For the Netherlands and France 
the differences are somewhat larger. We find an industry ppp of around 2.44 
Dfl/$ for the Netherlands against 2.37 Dfl/$ according to Burger. For France 
the difference between our own estimate and Burger’s is around 7 percent 
(5.18 against 5.56 Ffr/$ for total industry).25
23. R. Fremdling, H. de Jong and M.P. Timmer, ‘British and German Manufacturing 
Productivity Compared: a New Benchmark for 1935/6 based on Double Deflated Value 
Added’, The Journal of Economic History 67 (2007) 350-378; de Jong and Woltjer, ‘Depres-
sion Dynamics’.
24. O’Brien and Keyder, Economic growth, 40-47.
25. A. Burger, ‘A five-country comparison of industrial labour productivity 1850-1990’, 
N.W. Posthumus Institute Working Paper (1994) 5.
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A further decomposition of the manufacturing sector offers additional 
insights in the price structure of the four economies. Table 1 shows that the 
relative price differences across the manufacturing branches were quite 
substantial as well, especially in the Netherlands and France. Such price dif-
ferences testify to a specific pattern of industrial specialisation which will 
become even more evident when we discuss the labour productivity com-
parisons further below. The Dutch case offers the best example. Considering 
the official exchange rate of 2.49 Dfl/$ (see table 1) it appears that the Dutch 
food and textile trades managed to produce at competitive price levels, while 
the chemical and metal trades were way too expensive to be internationally 
competitive.26 The observed price differences within the manufacturing sec-
tor show that the use of a uniform currency converter, such as the official 
exchange rate, will not generate accurate productivity comparisons at branch 
or sector level since it rules out the possibility of inter-industry price differ-
ences.27
Comparative labour productivity
What new light do these ppp estimates shed on international labour pro-
ductivity comparisons? Table 2 presents the comparative labour productivity 
estimates with the us as base country. Unsurprisingly, our results confirm 
the existence of a large transatlantic productivity gap in industry. This phe-
nomenon has been extensively documented in the economic historical litera-
ture.28 us industrial productivity levels were about 220 percent of the uk, 240 
percent of France and 350 percent of the Netherlands. The intra-European 
productivity gaps were substantial as well, with the uk having a productivity 
lead of roughly 50 percent over the Netherlands and France in agriculture and 
industry combined. However, the industrial productivity gap between France 
26. J. de Jonge, De industrialisatie in Nederland tussen 1850 en 1914 (Amsterdam 1968); R. 
Griffiths, Industrial retardation in the Netherlands: 1830-1850 (Den Haag 1979), J.P. Smits, E. 
Horlings and J.L. van Zanden, Dutch gnp and its components, 1800-1913 (Groningen 2000).
27. D. Paige, and G. Bombach, A comparison of national output and productivity of the United 
Kingdom and the United States (Paris 1959).
28. See for instance Paige and Bombach, A comparison; L. Rostas, Comparative productivity 
in British and American industry (Cambridge 1948); R.J. Gordon, ‘Two centuries of eco-
nomic growth: Europe chasing the American frontier’, cepr Discussion Paper 4415 (2004); 
S.N. Broadberry, The Productivity Race: British Manufacturing in International Perspective 
(Cambridge 1997); Ward and Devereux, ‘Measuring British decline’; A. Field, ‘The most 
technologically progressive decade of the century’, The American Economic Review 93 (2003) 
1399-1413; ibid, ‘The origins of us total factor productivity growth in the Golden Age’, 
Cliometrica 2 (2007) 63-90.
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and Britain was far less dramatic.29 Nonetheless, the British economy was 
considerably ahead in terms of structural change with a far more specialized 
agricultural sector. Around 1910 only 12 percent of the British labour force 
was engaged in agriculture, whereas this share was closer to 30 percent in the 
Netherlands and as high as 41 percent in France. Having a large portion of its 
labour force tied down in the low-productive agricultural sector dragged down 
the average productivity level in both the Netherlands and France. 
Table 2 Comparative labour productivity, us, uk, nl and fr (ca. 1910)
          comparative labour productivity (us=100)
 uk/us nl/us fr/us
Agriculture 56 47 37
Industry 45 29 41
 Mining 38 10 39
 Construction 75 32 53
 Manufacturing 42 29 40
 Metals & machinery 38 18 45
 Textiles, leather & clothing 48 29 46
 Food, drink & tobacco 47 40 38
 Chemicals 49 10 32
 Miscellaneous 43 40 49
Total: agriculture & industry 56 35 38
Sources: see appendix.
So far our findings are in line with a large body of literature discussing the 
comparative advantages of the Western European economies during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. For instance, it clarifies the French 
policy choice for agricultural protectionism in an era of globalisation.30 It 
squares with the evolution of a specialised agro-commercial economy in the 
Netherlands in an era of rapid industrialisation in its neighbour countries.31 
29. P. O’Brien and C. Keyder, Economic growth in Britain and France 1780-1914 (London 
1978) 146.
30. L.C.A. Knowles, ‘Economic development in the nineteenth century. France, Germany, 
Russia and the United States’ Studies in Economics and Political Science 109 (1932) 239-253; 
J.P. Dormois ‘The impact of late-nineteenth-century tariffs on the productivity of European 
industries (1870-1930)’, in: J.P. Dormois & P. Lains (eds.) Classical Trade Protectionism 1815-
1914 (London 2006) 160-192.
31. Griffiths, Achterlijk, achter of anders? Aspecten van de economische ontwikkeling van 
Nederland in de 19e eeuw (Amsterdam 1980); J.L. van Zanden and A. van Riel, The strictures 
of inheritance: the Dutch economy in the nineteenth century (Princeton 2004).
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And our results also underscore the Dutch economy as a coal-poor economy.32 
Considering the Anglo-French productivity comparison it is remarkable to see 
how close our estimates are to the 1978 results of O’Brien and Keyder, who 
estimated French industrial labour productivity in the years 1905-1913 to be 
somewhere between 94 to 98 percent of the British level.33
The difference with the results reported by Dormois is larger though. Dor-
mois finds French industrial productivity levels at 32 of the us level in 1909, 
against 41 percent in our estimation.34 As we rely on Dormois’ value added 
and employment estimates, this gap must be fully attributed to the different 
currency conversion methods applied.35 Dormois uses the official exchange 
rate to convert French industrial labour productivity into us dollars for 1909. 
32. B. Gales, Ondergronds bovengronds. Techniek en markt van de Limburgse steenkolenmijnbouw 
gedurende de achttiende en negentiende eeuw (Capelle aan de IJssel 2002).
33. Our 1910 estimate for industry shows a comparative French productivity level of approx-
imately 91 percent of the uk, see table 2.
34. Dormois, ‘Tracking the elusive French productivity lag’, 7-8.
35. A small part of the difference is due to the inclusion of mining in Dormois’ comparison, 
which we treat separately in this paper. 
A Mississippi river landing in Memphis, Tennessee, 1906. Steam ships greatly reduced 
transportation costs in domestic and international trade since the mid-nineteenth century.  
Source: Library of Congress, Call no. lc-d4-19395. 
 Changing Economic Leadership » 95
However, as we have argued above, considering the large inter-industry price 
differences we find this approach difficult to defend.  
Compared to the work on the Anglo-American productivity comparison 
the picture is mixed. Our uk-us manufacturing productivity level of 42 is 
lower than the estimate of 49 reported by Broadberry and Irwin, but both 
these estimates confirm the existence of a large transatlantic productivity gap 
for manufacturing in the early twentieth century, as previously discussed.36 
Britain’s falling behind the us during the nineteenth century has traditionally 
been explained by differences in factor and resource endowments as well as 
demand patterns.37 The abundance of land and natural resources in the us 
gave rise to more capital- and resource-intensive production, a process which 
was further facilitated by a relatively homogenous demand for goods.38 In 
contrast, in Britain natural resources were scarce while skilled labour was 
in ample supply, providing an incentive to economize on fixed capital in the 
form of machinery.39 
However, the role played by resources in the Anglo-American manufac-
turing productivity gap is underscored by the relatively high Anglo-American 
ppp we find for agriculture and particularly mining – the sectors providing the 
bulk of resources and inputs for production in manufacturing – presented in 
table 1, and it is here that our results deviate from part of the literature. We 
find a substantially greater Anglo-American productivity gap in mining than 
Broadberry and Irwin. We appraise British value added per worker at 38 per-
cent of the American level, while Broadberry and Irwin cite an estimate of 62 
percent. The main source for the discrepancy between both benchmark esti-
mates is the method of productivity comparison. Broadberry and Irwin rely 
on ‘quantity relatives’ and estimate comparative productivity in mining solely 
on the basis of the physical production of coal and iron ore. Even though coal 
and iron ore comprise the bulk of output and employment in this sector, by 
focusing solely on these two items Broadberry and Irwin ignore the contribu-
tion of other upcoming mining products, most notably gas and fuel oils (e.g. 
petroleum).40
The superior performance of the American mining sector can, in part, be 
explained by the sheer quantity and quality of natural resources in this coun-
try. For the coal-mining sector, McCloskey shows that the ‘American seams 
were generally thicker, closer to the surface, freer from faults, flatter and drier 
36. Broadberry and Irwin, ‘Labor productivity’, 261; S.N. Broadberry, ‘Comparative produc-
tivity in British and American manufacturing during the nineteenth century’, Explorations 
in Economic History 31 (1994) 521-548, 524.
37. Habakkuk, American and British technology, 122; Broadberry, The productivity race, 3.
38. Broadberry, ‘Technology leadership’, 291.
39. P. Temin, ‘Labour scarcity in America’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History 1 (1971) 162.
40. International Labour Office, The world coal-mining industry (Geneva 1938) 33-36.
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than British seams.’41 The favourable geological conditions allowed Ameri-
can miners to introduce new mechanized methods of production and work 
considerably more efficiently than their British counterparts. Taylor’s anal-
ysis underscores the British mine-owners conservative attitude toward the 
adoption of new innovations and technologies through, for instance, the late 
adoption of electricity as well as the hesitant introduction of the mechanized 
coal-cutter in the British mines.42 As was the case for manufacturing, Ameri-
can miners took full advantage of the major improvements in labour-saving 
technologies during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, whereas 
British improvements focused primarily on overcoming the diminishing 
returns to land as the coal and ore deposits were slowly being exhausted.43 
These developments drove a wedge between the labour productivity levels of 
both countries, resulting in a productivity ratio in the mining sector around 
0.38 to 1 in favour of the us.
Contrary to the consensus view, our results also highlight the compara-
tively strong performance of the American agricultural sector. We find a vast 
American lead in agricultural productivity of almost 2:1, while Broadberry 
and Irwin arrive at a figure close to parity.44 The main source for the discrep-
ancy in the agricultural labour productivity estimates is not the method of 
productivity comparison but is the underlying figure of us value added per 
worker for this sector. In an earlier study, on which Broadberry and Irwin base 
their estimate, Broadberry lists a us net output per employee value of 347$.45 
We base our considerably higher estimate of 488$ per worker on the value 
added figures listed in the Historical Statistics and the agricultural employ-
ment reported by Lebergott.46 Although the estimation of employment and 
particularly value added in agriculture is considerably more difficult than it is 
for other sectors, none of the primary sources point in the direction of a figure 
as low as suggested by Broadberry. In addition, net output per worker in the 
British agricultural sector appears to be overstated by Broadberry; 78£ versus 
41. D. McCloskey, ‘International differences in productivity? Coal and steel in America and 
Britain before World War i’, in: D. McCloskey (ed.), Essays on a mature economy (Princeton 
1971) 285-304, 293.
42. A. Taylor, ‘Labour productivity and technological innovation in the British coal industry, 
1850-1914’, Economic History Review 14 (1961) 48-70, 58; see also, R. Walters, ‘Labour pro-
ductivity in South Wales steam-coal industry, 1870-1914’, Economic History Review 28 (1975) 
280-303, 296.
43. McCloskey, ‘International differences in productivity?’, 289-90.
44. Broadberry and Irwin estimate British productivity in agricultural to have been 92 per-
cent of the American level; see, Broadberry and Irwin, ‘Labor productivity’, 261.
45. Broadberry, ‘Forging ahead’, 27.
46. S. Carter et al., Historical statistics of the United States, vol. 4: economic sectors (Cambridge 
2006) 193; S. Lebergott, Manpower in economic growth: the American record since 1800 (New 
York 1964) 510.
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our estimate of 64£.47 The higher estimate by Broadberry is the result of his 
choice to exclude the agricultural production in Ireland from his productivity 
estimate. This, however, is inconsistent with the definition used by Feinstein 
as well as the industrial benchmark.48 We reincorporated Irish production 
and employment in the productivity figures and made a (minor) revision to 
the relative Anglo-American price levels listed by Broadberry.49
These adjustments to the productivity estimates listed above are not only 
in line with those suggested in a recent paper by Ward and Devereux, they 
also substantiate Habakkuk’s claim of relatively high levels of productivity in 
American agriculture.50 In his monograph, Habakkuk argues that during the 
nineteenth century ‘America[n] improvements in agriculture took the form 
primarily of increasing output per head and the increase initially was prob-
ably more rapid than in industry; in England on the other hand, agricultural 
improvement was devoted primarily to increasing yields per acre.’51 Reflecting 
his well-known thesis for industry, Habakkuk contends that the abundance of 
resources and scarcity of (skilled) labour in the us forced American farmers to 
pursue capital-intensive methods of production. Machinery and particularly 
land were substituted for labour, resulting in high levels of labour productiv-
ity. The importance of labour-saving innovations also features prominently 
in subsequent accounts of the American agricultural development, stress-
ing the relative productivity of this sector in international perspective.52 Fur-
thermore, Olmstead and Rhode demonstrate the importance of biological 
innovations in the form of improved crops and livestock.53 These biological 
innovations allowed the farm frontier to be pushed to the drier and harsher 
West and North, continuously expanding the available land for cultivation. 
This depressed the price of farmland in relation to labour even further. These 
developments allowed American agriculture to become regionally special-
ized, reaping all the benefits of returns-to-scale and raising productivity levels 
in the process. 
The labour productivity comparisons for the five manufacturing branches 
(table 2) shows that in the Netherlands the comparative productivity gap 
between the heavy industries such as the metal and chemical trades and the 
47. Broadberry, ‘Forging ahead’ 27; Feinstein, National income, 208; C.H. Feinstein, 
Statistical tables of national income, expenditure and output of the uk (Cambridge 1976) T60, 
T131.
48. Feinstein, National income, 8-10.
49. Broadberry, ‘Forging ahead’, 27.
50. Ward and Devereux, ‘Relative British and American income levels’, 267-268.
51. Habakkuk, American and British technology, 11-14.
52. W. Hayami and V. Ruttan, Agricultural development: an international perspective (Balti-
more 1985) 16.
53. A. Olmstead and P. Rhode, Creating abundance: biological innovation and American 
agricultural development (New York 2008) 387.
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lighter industries such as textiles and foodstuffs loomed large. Labour pro-
ductivity in the food producing industries was, on average and relative to 
the us, more than twice as high as in the metal industries and even three 
times as high as in the chemical industries. It reveals the defects of the Dutch 
industrial sector during the nineteenth century: a complete absence of com-
petitive heavy industries. Dutch manufacturing was based on the linkages 
it could establish with the specialised agricultural sector (food industries) 
and the colonial relationships with the Dutch Indies (textiles).54 Only during 
the interwar years did the Dutch manufacturing sector experience a strong 
phase of catch-up growth and diversification enhanced by the rapid adoption 
of electricity.55 The Anglo-American figures confirm that American producers 
excelled in the production of durable goods (e.g. metal, engineering and wood 
products), while the British manufactures were relatively productive in the 
non-durable industries (e.g. food, textile and chemicals). As noted by Broad-
berry, these industry-specific productivity results are broadly in line with the 
figures on revealed comparative advantage in British and American manu-
facturing trade by Crafts and Thomas.56 In contrast, in France the chemical 
industry was comparatively weak, about 32 percent of the us level, while the 
textile industries did comparatively well, roughly 46 percent of the us level.
Structural differences
A more detailed analysis of the productivity gap between the us and the three 
Western European countries in manufacturing also sheds new light on the 
impact of ‘structural’ and ‘compositional’ differences. Standard economic 
theory predicts that in an open economy setting countries tend to specialise 
in activities in which they have a comparative advantage. In the hypothetical 
case that the employment structure of the uk, Netherlands and France would 
have been exactly identical to the us, ‘compositional’ differences are zero and 
would not affect the aggregate manufacturing productivity gap. Yet, in real-
ity, The French and British textile industry employed respectively 46 and 37 
percent of the manufacturing labour force against 26 percent in the us. And 
while the us food industry employed only 11 percent, in the Netherlands this 
share was 35 percent of the manufacturing workforce. 
54. Smits et al., Dutch gnp, 40-45; Van Zanden and Van Riel, Strictures of inheritance, 295-
304.
55. The most comprehensive account available of this process is offered by the H. de 
Jong, Catching up twice: the nature of Dutch industrial growth during the twentieth century in a 
comparative perspective (Berlin 2003) 160.
56. Broadberry, The productivity race, 523; N. Crafts and M. Thomas, ‘Comparative advan-
tage in uk manufacturing trade’, The Economic Journal 96 (1986) 629-645, 639.
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To find out how large the effects of industrial specialisation on the pro-
ductivity comparison are, table 3 repeats the manufacturing productivity com-
parison of table 2 in the last column, based on the geometric average of the 
employment distribution in the base economy and the comparison economy 
(Fisher). The columns above report the comparative productivity levels using 
the employment distribution of the us (Laspeyres) and the comparison coun-
try (Paasche).
Table 3 The effects of the employment structure on comparative labour productivity in 
manufacturing: us, uk, nl and fr (ca. 1910)
           comparative labour productivity (us=100)
 uk/us nl/us fr/us
Laspeyres (us weights) 40 25 40
Paasche (own country weights) 44 35 40
Fisher (geometric average) 42 29 40
Sources: see appendix.
Table 3 shows that all three countries reveal higher productivity levels vis-à-vis 
the us when we use their own employment distribution. It can thus be argued 
that, again in relation to the us, the Western European economies indeed spe-
cialised in a ‘rational’ way, that is, according to their comparative advantages. 
Given the small differences observed for the uk and France we should not 
make too much of this conclusion though. More interesting, however, is the 
compositional effect on labour productivity in the notably smaller and more 
open economy of the Netherlands: using a Laspeyres or Paasche ppp makes a 
difference of nearly 10 percentage points in estimated manufacturing produc-
tivity! This again supports the view that the industrialisation process in the 
Netherlands before World War One was based on developing some niches, 
rather than an encompassing industrial sector. We will see in the next section 
that missing the boat during the first and second industrial revolutions put 
the Dutch economy in a more backward position than existing comparative 
estimates of gdp per capita suggest, despite the strong performance of the 
Dutch in services.   
Total economy and long-run implications
Until now this study focused on agriculture, mining and industry – the goods 
producing sectors of the economy. However, in our attempts to chart the rela-
tive strength of the various economies at the eve of World War one, the service 
sector needs to be taken into account as well. Table 4 summarizes the main 
findings from the previous section and includes estimates for services made 
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by Burger and Smits.57 These data are aggregated in order to get an idea of 
international differences in economy-wide labour productivity as well as vari-
ations in gdp per capita.
Table 4 Comparative productivity and income, us, uk, nl and fr (ca. 1910)
comparative productivity and income (us=100)
 uk/us nl/us fr/us
Agriculture 56 47 37
Industry 45 29 41
Services 84 85 68
gdp per worker 71 53 47
gdp per capita 77 52 60
Sources: see appendix.
Burger and Smits constructed their service sector productivity estimates 
based on an industry-of-origin approach for transport (railways), communi-
cation, trade, government and other (personal) services. Their estimates were 
derived from the relative prices of transportation (freight rates as well as tar-
iffs for passengers), the prices of postal items, telegrams and telephone calls 
as well as average trade margins for the trade sector. Burger and Smits used 
two different sets of estimates for government and other (personal) services. 
In one set the differences in real wages were used as an indication of com-
parative levels of labour productivity for these types of services, assuming 
perfect market conditions. In the second set of estimates these two branches 
within the service sector were set at 100, assuming no international produc-
tivity differences. It seems that the overall comparative productivity levels for 
the service sector at large are hardly affected by these different methods of 
estimation. 
The main conclusion that can be drawn from table 4 is that international 
disparities in productivity in the service sector were much lower than they 
were in the goods-producing sectors. Including services in the total economy 
comparison thus results in a much higher degree of convergence around 
1910 than suggested by the combined estimates for agriculture and industry. 
The addition of services raises the French economy-wide productivity levels 
with 9, the British with 15 and the Dutch with 18 percentage points versus 
the us.
Table 5 compares our new results with previous attempts to measure the 
differences in gdp per capita between the four countries. Our industry-of-
57. A. Burger and J.P. Smits, ‘A benchmark comparison of service productivity between 
Europe and the United States for 1910’, Economic and social history in the Netherlands 7 
(1996), 133-158.
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origin estimates are compared with expenditure-based productivity calcula-
tions by Ward and Devereux. Besides, for the uk, also the Broadberry and 
Irwin estimates (both industry-of-origin and expenditure based calculations) 
are included. Moreover, the estimates are compared with the various versions 
of the Maddison dataset expressed in 1970, 1985 and 1990 dollars.
Table 5 Different approaches to estimate comparative levels of gdp per capita, us, uk,  
 nl and fr (ca. 1910)
    Comp. gdp per capita (us=100)
Author Approach Year uk nl fr
This study industry-of-origin 1910 77 52 60
Ward & Devereux expenditure 1905 82/92 63 67
Broadberry & Irwin quantity relatives 1909/11 89
Broadberry & Irwin expenditure 1909/11 95
Maddison 1990 GK$ 1910 93 76 60
Maddison 1985 GK$ 1910 80 65 55
Maddison 1970 GK$ 1910 79 68 64
Sources: Ward and Devereux, ‘New perspectives’ (92, 63 and 67) and ‘Measuring British 
decline’ (82); Broadberry and Irwin, ‘Labor productivity’; Maddison, Phases of capitalist de-
velopment (1970$); Maddison, Dynamic Forces (1985$) and Maddison, The world economy 
(1990$)
For all three Western European countries our gdp per capita estimates are 
lower than hitherto suggested in the literature. For France the differences are 
between 0 and 11 percent. For the uk our estimate amounts to 77 percent, 
which is 14 to 21 percent below the Broadberry and Irwin estimate. However, 
our Anglo-American figure is perfectly in line with Ward and Devereux’s fig-
ures once we take the difference in benchmark year (1905 versus 1910) into 
account (see figure 2 below).58 Yet, the largest difference we find is for the 
Netherlands. The most recent Maddison data point at an income level of 76 
percent of that of the United States. The expenditure based estimate of Ward 
and Devereux stands much lower at 63 percent and our new industry-of-ori-
gin figure measures a relative income level of only 52 percent. Interestingly, 
the Maddison estimates expressed in 1985 and 1970 dollars are in nearly all 
cases closer to our new benchmark estimate, suggesting that they reflect the 
relative prices of 1910 better than the 1990 ppps.
58. This estimate ‘92’ is taken from a yet unpublished working paper presented at the 
International Economic History Congress 2006, in Helsinki. We would like to thank the 
authors for permission to cite their paper. See Ward and Devereux, ‘New perspectives 
on international standards of living in the late nineteenth century’, paper presented at xiv 
Economic History Congress (Helsinki 2006).
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Implications for the debate on changing economic leadership
This final section focuses on the implications of our results for the debate 
concerning the timing of the Anglo-Dutch and Anglo-American take over 
during the long nineteenth century. 
The Anglo-American take over
The discussion on the timing of the economic overtaking by the us during 
the nineteenth and early twentieth century has been quite intense. In his 
1997 and 1998 articles Broadberry argued that the United States overtook 
the United Kingdom in the 1900s.59 In 2003 this view has been contested 
by Ward and Devereux who, on the basis of brand-new expenditure ppp esti-
mates, maintained that already in the 1870s the relative level of gdp per capita 
of the us was higher than that of the uk.60 Prados de la Escosura even argued 
that the us was already ahead of the uk in the first half of the nineteenth 
century.61 However, in subsequent publications Broadberry and Broadberry 
and Irwin maintained their view that the economic overtaking of the United 
States cannot be dated as early as Ward and Devereux suggest.62
A backward projection of our benchmark estimates on existing time-
series presented in figure 2 adds evidence to the revisionist view, although it 
also suggests that the take over may be more difficult to pin-point to a single 
decade than hitherto has been assumed. For the time series we rely on figures 
by Maddison, allowing us to compare the extrapolated gdp per capita figures 
against the Anglo-American comparative per capita income figures by Broad-
berry and Irwin.63
The estimates by Broadberry and Irwin show a substantial British lead 
in per capita income terms between 1870 and 1890. According to their esti-
mates, the us overtook the uk in gdp per capita between 1900 and 1910.64 
Our benchmark extrapolation dates the overtaking considerably earlier. We 
find that around 1870 the uk enjoyed a small lead in per capita income terms. 
By 1880 this lead had dissipated and between 1880 to 1900 the us level of 
gdp per capita remained roughly on par with the uk. During the first three 
59. Broadberry, ‘Forging ahead’; S.N. Broadberry, ‘How did the United States and Germany 
overtake Britain? A sectoral analysis of comparative productivity levels’, Journal of Economic 
History 58 (1998) 375-407.
60. Ward and Devereux, ‘Measuring British decline’, 840.
61. Prados de la Escosura, ‘International comparisons of real product’, 24-31.
62. Broadberry, ‘Relative per capita income differentials’, 860-861; Broadberry and Irwin, 
‘Labour productivity in the United States and the United Kingdom’, 272.
63. Broadberry and Irwin, ‘Labor productivity’, 261; Maddison, The world economy; Bolt and 
van Zanden, ‘The first update of the Maddison project’.
64. Broadberry and Irwin, ‘Labor productivity’, 269.
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 decades of the twentieth century, however, the us charged ahead and the 
income gap widened to nearly 60 percent in the 1920s.
Particularly the substantial us lead in agriculture and industry, which we 
observe in our 1910 benchmark, provides firm evidence for a strong overall 
lead in total economy productivity. Our study adds evidence to the revisionist 
view by Ward and Devereux, as we confirm the high Anglo-American produc-
tivity differential for agriculture as explained in more detail above. In addi-
tion, the Anglo-American income gap was widened further by the substantial 
productivity differential in mining, which was a non-negligible sector in both 
the American and British economy. However, as argued by Broadberry, dif-
ferences in the employment structure between both economies did play a 
role in the relative income and productivity differentials. The low share of 
British employees in the agricultural sector provided Britain with a structural 
advantage that substantially reduced the gap in the overall level of productiv-
ity between the us and the uk.
Even though our new estimate of relative gdp per capita is very similar 
to the early twentieth century benchmark by Ward and Devereux, the long-
run trend illustrated in figure 2 does not correspond particularly well to their 
nineteenth century expenditure benchmarks. Ward and Devereux show the 
us leading in terms of income per capita as early as 1872. In addition, they 
estimate a considerable gap in relative income levels between the us and the 
Figure 2 Comparative gdp per capita, us and uk (uk=100, 1870-1930)
Sources: see text.
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uk throughout the 1872-1905 period. On the basis of our new benchmark 
and time-series evidence, we come to the conclusion that this appears to over-
state the actual relative American income level in comparison to the uk. This 
difference should be attributed to our different choice of method, as Ward 
and Devereux rely on final consumer prices using the expenditure approach, 
whereas our estimates are based on the industry-of-origin approach. 
Nevertheless, our 1910 benchmark confirms the existence of a large gap in 
comparative productivity between the us and the uk in agriculture and indus-
try and provides strong evidence for a sizable American advantage in terms 
of gdp per worker and gdp per capita at the start of the twentieth century.
The Anglo-Dutch take over
Our results also shed a new light on the comparative productivity perfor-
mance of the uk versus the the Netherlands. According to the Maddison 
data it was only after mid-century that the uk overtook the Netherlands in 
terms of income per head of population. The backwards extrapolation of our 
new benchmark provides a long-run view in comparative economic strength 
which we believe is more plausible. Table 6 presents the differences.
Table 6 Long-run changes in relative levels of gdp per capita in the Dutch Republic/ 
 the Netherlands (uk=100, 1700-1913)







Sources: Table 4; J. Bolt and J.L. van Zanden (2013). The first update of the Maddison pro-
ject; re-estimating growth before 1820. Maddison Project Working Paper 4.
In the early eighteenth century the Dutch Republic still enjoyed higher levels 
of income per head of population than the uk. However, we find that the 
income lead of the Dutch was much smaller (34 against 62 percent) than sug-
gested by Maddison. Besides, a backwards extrapolation of our time-series, 
based on Maddison’s time series, indicates that already before the 1820s the 
British economy had forged ahead in terms of relative income levels. Our 
estimates are more in line with the Dutch historiography claiming that out-
put levels plummeted in the Dutch Republic during the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century. Van Zanden and Van Riel label the Dutch economy and 
its underlying technological and institutional basis as ‘obsolete’ in this peri-
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od.65 For similar reasons de Vries and Van der Woude locate the take-over of 
England (note: not the uk!) around 1790.66
Data on comparative labour productivity at an industry level may shed 
more light on the timing of the change in economic leadership. First of all, 
the figures for Dutch manufacturing in table 7 point out the huge ‘productiv-
ity problem’ in this sector of the economy. The levels of comparative produc-
tivity in manufacturing were rather low around 1850 and they hardly showed 
any increase in the period up to 1910. The poor productivity performance can 
be explained from the slow and limited adoption of steam power in Dutch 
manufacturing.67 Traditional sources of energy, like wind, water and horse-
power prevailed. These technologies had remained unchanged from the sev-
enteenth century until about the 1850s.68
Table 7 Comparative levels of labour productivity in the Netherlands versus the uk,   
 (uk=100, 1850-1910)
 Agriculture Manufact. Total Industry Transport Trade Total Services
1849/51 n.a. 58 54 65 130 101
1859/61 106 51 46 77 110 94
1869/71 108 49 43 73 123 100
1879/81 96 63 46 66 109 98
1889/91 78 70 61 76 126 104
1899/01 89 65 57 92 113 102
1909/11 83 70 64 102 118 102
Sources: tables 2 and 4; Smits et al., Dutch gnp
The reason for the limited use of steam power was two-fold. First, levels of 
aggregate domestic demand were so low that traditional types of production 
(i.e. based on the use of wind- and water power) retained their cost advan-
tage over the introduction of steam engines characterised by high initial fixed 
costs.69 But even more important, in the industries in which the Dutch econ-
omy had strongly specialised, such as the food-processing industries, the use 
65. Van Zanden and Van Riel, Strictures of inheritance, 20-32.
66. J. de Vries and A. van der Woude, Nederland 1500-1815. De eerste ronde van moderne 
economische groei (Amsterdam 1995) 814.
67.  J.P. Smits, ‘The determinants of productivity growth in Dutch manufacturing, 1815-
1913’, European Review of Economic History 4 (2000) 223-238, 239-240.
68.  Jansen, De industriële ontwikkeling.
69.  Smits, ‘The determinants’, 235-238; Horlings and Smits point at the importance of 
demand constraints in the Dutch economy and its impact on the timing of modern eco-
nomic growth, see: E. Horlings and J.P. Smits, ‘Private consumer expenditure in the Neth-
erlands, 1800-1913’, Economic and Social History in the Netherlands 7 (1996) 15-40.
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of steam power proved difficult for technological reasons because of of a lack 
of feasible scale economies.70 
Other branches of the economy performed better. Midway the nineteenth 
century the Dutch level of labour productivity in agriculture as well as that 
of services was on par with the British level. The latter was especially due to 
the strong performance of the Dutch trade sector, which had a level of labour 
productivity which was substantially higher than in the uk. Indeed, agricul-
ture and services had been the two main pillars on which the economy of the 
Dutch Republic had been built in its Golden Age. 
Both of these branches witnessed a steady decline in comparative produc-
tivity rates vis-à-vis the us as well as the uk throughout the second half of the 
nineteenth century however. For agriculture the declining levels of compara-
tive labour productivity can at least partly be explained from the already high 
levels of productivity which were attained in the early nineteenth century: 
70.  H.W. Lintsen et al, Geschiedenis van de techniek in Nederland. De wording van een moderne 
samenleving, 1800-1890 (Zutphen 1992) 269-271.
Potato starch factory ‘Hollandia’ at Nieuw-Buinen (Groningen province), established in 
1898. Early Dutch manufacturing industry specialised mostly in the lighter industries, such 
as food, beverages and textiles, and were often embedded in the rural areas of the country.  
Source: http://www.terapelercourant.nl/tag/hollandia/; this picture from 1960.
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Dutch agriculture had already reached its efficiency frontier. 71 The agricul-
tural sector became strongly commercialised and export-oriented from the 
late Middle Ages onwards. De Vries explains the high levels of productivity 
in farming in the early modern period in terms of a deliberate process of 
specialisation.72 The scope for further increases in labour productivity was 
limited, as the slow increases in agricultural output per worker indeed show.73
For services the explanation of a poor comparative productivity perfor-
mance in the second half of the nineteenth century is less straightforward. 
Also in this case the levels of comparative productivity were initially quite 
high. But these high levels of labour productivity cannot be ascribed to the 
‘modern’ or efficient features of the Dutch service sector, on the contrary. 
They were rather a symptom of the pre-modern (and sometimes even archaic) 
way in which the domestic trade and transport industries were organised, 
built on intimate relationships between regional, national and international 
staple markets. The main aim of these staple markets was to keep stocks up 
so as to be able to supply goods to the hinterland whenever necessary. Within 
this intricate trade system with its many middlemen who all enjoyed monop-
olies on their specific types of trade, huge trade margins could be realised. 
The same applied to the domestic transport system which until the first half 
of the nineteenth century was bound by strict rules and under the control of 
city councils which guaranteed entrepreneurs in the shipping high freight 
rates.74 All in all, the specific institutions built around the trade and transport 
sector ensured people working in services with high incomes. 
From the 1870s onwards the comparative Dutch labour productivity in 
trade and transport showed a significant relative decline as can be seen from 
table 7. Especially in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when due to 
infrastructural improvements and better communication technologies there 
was less need for intermediate trade, more direct trade relations between 
producers and consumers were established. This resulted in declining trade 
margins, reflected in lower levels of labour productivity for the trade sector. 
It was only from the 1890s onwards, when the ‘old institutions’ of the Dutch 
71.  Van Zanden, ‘The First Green Revolution: The Growth of Production and Productivity 
in European Agriculture, 1870-1914’, Economic History Review 44 (1991) 219.
72.  J. de Vries, The Dutch rural economy in the golden age, 1500-1700 (New Haven 1974).
73.  Smits, ‘Technological change, institutional development and economic growth in 
Dutch agriculture, 1870-1939’, in: P. Lains V. Pinilla Agriculture and economic development 
in Europe since 1870 (London 2009). However, huge gains were made in terms of land 
productivity, as land became the scarcest factor of production. Output per hectare showed 
a strong increase throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. Even though levels 
of labour productivity did not increase that much, around 1910 the Dutch farmers were 
among the most productive in terms of land productivity.
74.  J.P. Smits, Economic growth and structural change in the Dutch service sector, 1850-1913. 
The role of trade and transport in the process of ‘modern economic growth (Amsterdam 1995).
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Republic had been broken down, that a new phase of productivity growth 
started in trade and transport. But in this case, productivity growth was not 
boosted by protection and monopolistic pricing, but by organisational change 
and technological innovation (especially in the transport sector), a process of 
innovation that had set in much earlier in the leading economies of the uk 
and the us.
Conclusion
In terms of its empirical contribution this study is the first we know of to 
have systematically applied an industry-of-origin approach to an international 
comparison of labour productivity between Western Europe and the United 
States for a pre-World War One benchmark year, including all sectors of the 
economy. It complements the extensive work that has been undertaken on 
the uk-us comparison and it has cleared some uncovered terrain for the Neth-
erlands and France. This article has made a deliberate distinction between a 
presentation of the main results, focusing on the productivity estimates for 
agriculture and industry between the four countries, and the total economy 
and long run implications which always tend to be of a more tentative nature. 
The main results demonstrate that the Atlantic productivity gap around 
1910 extended to nearly all goods producing sectors of the economy. Also 
in the uk, agricultural productivity did not keep pace with the us, implying 
that the differences in the sector structure of the British economy played an 
important role in the intra-European productivity gap. For France we have 
documented a considerable difference in the international competitiveness of 
its manufacturing sector versus a large (in terms of employment shares) but 
much more vulnerable agricultural sector. The uneven development of Dutch 
manufacturing, with its strong bias towards lighter industries, underlines the 
importance of so-called compositional effects.
Even though the international disparity in levels of labour productivity in 
services was not as large as in agriculture and manufacturing, our estimates 
nevertheless point at less convergence in total national income and productiv-
ity levels on the eve of World War One than the Maddison estimates suggest. 
Applying the new benchmark estimates for 1910 to long term projections of 
gdp per capita and gdp per worker back into the nineteenth century reveals 
an interesting new perspective on the dynamics of comparative long-term 
economic development. It rejects the view of Broadberry and Irwin that the 
uk maintained an income lead until the closing decades of the nineteenth 
century and lends support to Ward and Devereux’s revisionist view. Our 
results also indicate that the Dutch lost their economic leadership already 
before 1820 and not after 1850, as suggested by the Maddison data. 
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Rather than offering any definitive answers to the questions of long run 
economic growth and dynamics, our new 1910 benchmark estimate serves 
as a starting point for further investigations based on an industry-of-origin 
approach. A lot of work remains to be done on improving the quality of 
time-series of gross output, value added and employment for the nineteenth 
century, and in many cases the early twentieth century as well. In addition, 
expanding and improving estimates of service sector productivity is crucial to 
arrive at a more complete picture of convergence and divergence of income 
and productivity levels since the industrial revolution. 
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Appendix Primary and secondary sources used to calculate ppps and estimate 
comparative labour productivity 
UNITED STATES
Purchasing Power Parities (ppp)
Agriculture: Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census of the United States taken in the year 
1910, Volume v, Agriculture 1909 and 1910, General Report and Analysis (Washington 
1913).
Mining: Department of the Interior, United States Geological Survey, Mineral Resources 
of the United States 1910 (Washington 1911).
Construction: Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census of the United States taken in the 
year 1910, Volume x, Manufactures 1909, Reports for Principal Industries (Washington 
1913).
Utilities: Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census of the United States taken in the year 
1910, Volume x, Manufactures 1909, Reports for Principal Industries (Washington 
1913); ibid, Census of Electrical Industries 1917, central electric light and power stations 
(Washington 1920).
Manufacturing: Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census of the United States taken in the 
year 1910, Volume x, Manufactures 1909, Reports for Principal Industries (Washington 
1913).
Services: A. Burger and J.P. Smits, ‘A benchmark comparison of service productivity 
between Europe and the United States for 1910’, Economic and social history in 
the Netherlands 7 (1996); S.N. Broadberry and D.A. Irwin, ‘Labor productivity 
in the United States and the United Kingdom during the nineteenth century’, 
Explorations in Economic History 43:2 (2006).
Value Added (va)
gdp at market prices: J. Kendrick, Productivity trends in the United States (Princeton 
1961) table A-IIb, 296-29.
Agriculture: S. Carter et al., Historical statistics of the United States: millennial edition 
(Cambridge 2006) volume 4: economic sectors.
Mining: Department of the Interior, United States geological survey, mineral resources of 
the United States 1910 (Washington 1911).
Construction: W. King, The national income and its purchasing power (New York 1930).
Manufacturing: S. Carter et al., Historical statistics of the United States: millennial edition 
(Cambridge 2006) volume 4: economic sectors; Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth 
Census of the United States taken in the year 1910, Volume x, Manufactures 1909, 
Reports for Principal Industries (Washington 1913).
Services: Obtained by deducting agriculture and industry from total economy. 
Labour Force
Total employment: J. Kendrick (1961), Productivity trends in the United States (Princeton 
1961) table a-vii, 308.
Agriculture: Lebergott (1964), Manpower in economic growth: the American record since 
1800 (New York 1964) 510.
Industry and services: J. Kendrick (1961), Productivity trends in the United States (Prin-
ceton 1961) table a-vii, 308.
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Manufacturing shares: Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth census of the United States 
taken in the year 1910, Volume x, Manufactures 1909, Reports for Principal Industries 
(Washington 1913).
Total Population: A. Maddison, Statistics on world population, gdp and per capita gdp, 
1-2008 ad (Groningen 2009).
UNITED KINGDOM
Purchasing Power Parities (ppp)
Agriculture: Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural statistics, 1908 (London 
1910).
Mining: Board of Trade, Final report on the first census of production of the United 
Kingdom, 1907 (London 1912).
Construction: A. Burger, ‘A five-country comparison of industrial labour productivity 
1850-1990’, N.W. Posthumus Institute Working Paper (1994).
Utilities: A. Burger, ‘A five-country comparison of industrial labor productivity 1850-
1990’, N.W. Posthumus Institute Working Paper (1994).
Manufacturing: Board of Trade, Final report on the first census of production of the United 
Kingdom, 1907 (London 1912).
Services: A. Burger and J.P. Smits, ‘A benchmark comparison of service productivity 
between Europe and the United States for 1910’, Economic and social history in 
the Netherlands 7 (1996); S.N. Broadberry and D.A. Irwin, ‘Labor productivity 
in the United States and the United Kingdom during the nineteenth century’, 
Explorations in Economic History 43:2 (2006).
Note: All uvrs based on 1907 prices have been adjusted with the final output deflator 
from C.H. Feinstein, Statistical tables of national income, expenditure and output of 
the uk (Cambridge 1976) T132.
Value Added (va)
gdp at market prices: C.H. Feinstein, Statistical tables of national income, expenditure 
and output of the uk (Cambridge 1976) T10.
Sectoral shares: C.H. Feinstein, National income, expenditure and output of the United 
Kingdom, 1855-1965 (Cambridge 1972) table 10.2, 208.
Manufacturing shares: Board of Trade, Final report on the first census of production of the 
United Kingdom, 1907 (London 1912).
Labour Force
Total employment: C.H. Feinstein, Statistical tables of national income, expenditure and 
output of the uk (Cambridge 1976) T131.
Sectoral shares: C.H. Feinstein, Statistical tables of national income, expenditure and 
output of the uk (Cambridge 1976) T131.
Manufacturing shares: Board of Trade, Final report on the first census of production of the 
United Kingdom, 1907 (London 1912).
Total Population: A. Maddison, Statistics on world population, gdp and per capita gdp, 
1-2008 ad (Groningen 2009).
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THE NETHERLANDS
Purchasing Power Parities (ppp)
Agriculture: Departement van Landbouw, Nijverheid en handel, Verslag over den 
Landbouw in Nederland 1910 (’s-Gravenhage 1911).
Mining: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Statistiek van de Voortbrenging en het 
Verbruik der Nederlandsche Nijverheid in 1913 en 1916 (’s-Gravenhage 1920).
Construction: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Statistiek van de Voortbrenging en het 
Verbruik der Nederlandsche Nijverheid in 1913 en 1916 (’s-Gravenhage 1920).
Utilities: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Statistiek van de Voortbrenging en het 
Verbruik der Nederlandsche Nijverheid in 1913 en 1916 (’s-Gravenhage 1920).
Manufacturing: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Statistiek van de Voortbrenging en het 
Verbruik der Nederlandsche Nijverheid in 1913 en 1916 (’s-Gravenhage 1920).
Services: A. Burger and J.P. Smits, ‘A benchmark comparison of service productivity 
between Europe and the United States for 1910’, Economic and social history in the 
Netherlands 7 (1996).
Note: All manufacturing uvrs based on 1913 prices have been adjusted with sector 
specific wholesale price indices from J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden, 
Dutch gnp and its components, 1800-1913 (Groningen 2000) 124-53.
Value Added (va)
gdp at market prices (1909): J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden, Dutch gnp 
and its components, 1800-1913 (Groningen 2000) 221.
Sectoral shares (1909): J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden, Dutch gnp and its 
components, 1800-1913 (Groningen 2000) tables D.1-D.3, 121-55.
Labour Force
Total employment (1909): J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden, Dutch gnp and 
its components, 1800-1913 (Groningen 2000) table B.3, 114.
Sectoral shares (1909): J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden, Dutch gnp and its 
components, 1800-1913 (Groningen 2000) table B.3, 114.
Total Population: A. Maddison, Statistics on world population, gdp and per capita gdp, 
1-2008 ad (Groningen 2009).
FRANCE
Purchasing Power Parities (ppp)
Agriculture and industry: Ministere du Commerce, de l’Industrie, des Postes et des 
Telegraphes, Evaluation de la Production, fournis par les chambres de commerce (1910) 
et les statistiques administratives (1912) (Paris 1917); Ministère du Travail et de la 
Prévoyance Social, Annuaire Statistique de la France 1908 (Paris 1909); Ministère 
de l’Economie et des Finances, Annuaire Statistique de la France 1966, Résumé 
Rétrospectif, Soixante-Douzieme Volume (Paris 1967).
Services: A. Burger and J.P. Smits, ‘A benchmark comparison of service productivity 
between Europe and the United States for 1910’, Economic and social history in the 
Netherlands 7 (1996).
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Note: all uvrs based on 1908 price data have been adjusted with the price index of 
J.C. Toutain, ‘Le produit intérieur brut de la France de 1789 à 1982’, Economies et 
Societés 15 (1987) Chapitre 2. Les donneés annuelles (1815-1938).
Value Added (va)
gdp at market prices (1910): J.C. Toutain, ‘Le produit intérieur brut de la France de 
1789 à 1982’, Economies et Societés 15 (1987) Chapitre 2. Les donneés annuelles 
(1815-1938).
Agriculture: B.R. Mitchell, International historical statistics. Europe 1750-2005 (Basing-
stoke 2007) table J2, p. 1037.
Industry: J.P. Dormois, ‘Tracking the elusive French productivity lag in industry, 1840-
1973’, Hi-Stat Discussion Paper 152 (2006) table A7.
Services: Obtained by deducting agriculture and industry from total economy. 
Labour Force
Total employment: B.R. Mitchell, International historical statistics. Europe 1750-2005 
(Basingstoke 2007) table B1, 153.
Agriculture: Mitchell (2007) table B1, 153.
Industry: J.P. Dormois, ‘Tracking the elusive French productivity lag in industry, 1840-
1973’, Hi-Stat Discussion Paper 152 (2006) table A7.
Services: Obtained by deducting agriculture and industry from total labour force.
Total Population: A. Maddison, Statistics on world population, gdp and per capita gdp, 
1-2008 ad (Groningen 2009).
